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Abstract
Demands for Broadened Accountability (BA) of nonprofit organizations require that boards
achieve a high level of engagement to address important issues properly (Morrison & Salipante,
2007). This paper presents the theoretical basis for boards falling short of such engagement and
specifies fundamental obstacles leaders face in achieving BA. One set of especially salient
obstacles is conceptualized as false governance dilemmas. Two are considered in this paper:
legitimacy vs. efficiency (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; Morrison & Salipante,
2006) and conflict/monitoring vs. cooperation/collaboration. Two broadly defined relational
practices – integrative bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965) and maintenance of hightrust/high-distrust relationships (Lewicki, MacAllister, & Bies, 1998) – are presented as
mechanisms for establishing robust board engagement, transcending false governance dilemmas
and achieving BA. The authors suggest that a nonprofit paradox perspective (Cornforth, 2004)
enables the gradual development of such practices, engagement and accountability.

Introduction
Boards and executives of nonprofit organizations are responding to increased public
stakeholder demands for Broadened Accountability (BA), where BA means going beyond the
traditional rule-based forms of accountability to include the newer forms of negotiatedaccountability (Morrison & Salipante, 2007) Increasingly leaders recognize a need to account
for more than the explicit, objective dimensions of an organization such as finances, formal
planning, HR and legal affairs (Behn, 2001; Kearns, 1996). They must also account for the moreor-less implicit, subjective dimensions such as how well the mission is attained and to what
degree multiple stakeholders are included meaningfully. Demands for Broadened Accountability
of nonprofit organizations require that boards achieve a high level of engagement to address
important issues properly. This paper offers a theoretical basis for boards falling short of such
engagement, citing as cause the presumption of two dilemmas: legitimacy vs efficiency and
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conflict/monitoring vs. cooperation/collaboration. Refined concepts of human relationships –
particularly understandings of managerial agency and integrative bargaining and the simultaneity
of trust and distrust in everyday relationships indicate the two dilemmas to be false. This paper
posits a range of board practices which permit legitimacy and efficiency, and conflict/monitoring
and cooperation/collaboration to be simultaneously achieved in the pursuit of Broadened
Accountability. As such, the paper represents an exploration of processes involved in the
paradox model of nonprofit governance (Cornforth, 2004). The ability of boards and top-level
managers to identify and tackle relational problems is argued to be a prime requisite for boards to
gradually evolve practices that support a level of engagement needed to transcend false
dilemmas that impede the achievement Broadened Accountability.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Achieving BA: Transcending Two Key False Dilemmas

Legitimacy vs. Efficiency
The first and perhaps most important false dilemma presumes that leaders face a choice
between legitimacy vs. efficiency (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; Morrison &
Salipante, 2006), and the act of choosing one over the other erodes a board’s capacity for
engagement and achieving Broadened Accountability .

Neoinstitutional Theory and the Nonprofit Sector
The nonprofit sector is heavily institutionalized, with many nonprofit organizations
embedded in relationships with a variety of other organizations that influence their destiny. The
essence of institutional theory is that the survival of organizations is determined not only by their
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actual performance but also, and perhaps more strongly, by whether they are perceived by key
social actors as legitimate and worthy of support. Consequently, according to the theory,
organizations conform to practices that are perceived as signals of legitimacy, producing
isomorphism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996) – a homogeneity of practices
across organizations in a particular institutionalized field.
There have been surprisingly few studies applying neoinstitutional theory to the problems
of leading, managing and governing nonprofit organizations. In part, this is due to the
sociological approach to institutional theory emphasizing that environmental factors determine
organizational forms, providing relatively little room for discretionary action on the part of
managers (Zucker, 1987). It appears that the sociological approach has dominated in the
nonprofit literature. Suchman (1995), however, points out the differing approach to institutional
theory taken by scholars of organizational strategy. Contrary to standard interpretations of
neoinstitutional theory in the nonprofit sector, Zucker and Suchman see significant need and
possibility for managerial agency – that is, for action and decision-making by organizational
leaders.

The Need for Managerial Agency:
Dangers in Conforming to Practices that Confer Legitimacy

Organizational legitimacy can be defined as a general perception that the organization is
acting appropriately, that it is meaningful and valuable, given a set of values and beliefs
prevalent in the organization’s field (Suchman, 1995). As such, and in keeping with resource
dependency theory (Barney, 1991), legitimacy is argued to be critical to an organization’s
survival when this perception is held by actors such as foundations, United Ways, and
governmental units that control resources needed by the organization. These actors are in a
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position to coerce nonprofit organizations to adopt commonly favored practices, lest they lose
their legitimacy. The legitimacy-efficiency dilemma posed above manifests itself in common
but problematic understandings of best practices among nonprofit organizations, such as the
efficacy of strategic planning (Mintzberg, 1994), performance metrics (Alexander, 1999), interorganizational collaboration, and policy governance. Key social actors treat these practices, and
others, as indicators of an organization’s legitimacy and can withhold resources from
organizations that fail to display the practices. In addition to coercion, DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) note two other sources of prescriptive pressure. One is that professions create normative
expectations that their members will utilize accepted practices, a phenomenon heightened in the
nonprofit sector by the professionalizing of nonprofit management. The second is mimicry,
whereby organizational leaders attempting to cope with uncertainty mimic the actions taken by
other organizations.
If the organizational structures and processes that are transmitted through coercive,
normative and mimetic forces were truly effective in producing organizational performance,
there would seem to be no dilemma for nonprofit organizations. However, the use of nonprofit
board and management practices widely perceived as correct have been found to be largely
unrelated to organizational effectiveness (Herman & Renz, 2004). Indeed, Meyer & Rowan
(1977) have argued that any organizational attention to externally mandated ways of functioning
is, per se, organizationally inefficient, in part due to the displacing of goals (Selznick, 1949) and
deflecting of resources. In addition, there are problems due to imperfections in the prescribed
practices. A fundamental problem is that the value of an innovative practice is often overestimated by its innovators and first proponents, with more realistic assessments of its value
coming only after many years have passed and the practice has become taken-for-granted as

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454127

Page 5 Towards Achieving Broadened Accountability: Transcending Governance Dilemmas

effective. Such practices merit labels of myth and ceremony (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). They take
on symbolic value among leaders in organizational circles as indicators of competent practice.
Perhaps the most important long-term problem is that the loss of diversity in the case of extreme
rigidification of an institutional field results in diminished societal capacity to respond to future
unknown contingencies (Scott & Meyer, 1994). This diminished capacity is especially poignant
in the nonprofit sector where many missions are aimed at solving critical social problems that
emerge from the unique conditions of a particular time and place, conditions that are difficult to
foresee and may require novel organizational forms and practices.

Balancing the Neo-institutional Dilemma:
A Strategic Management Perspective & Integrative Bargaining

The strategic management literature presumes that organizational leaders can choose
from a range of actions in responding to external pressures and, hence, to the legitimacyefficiency dilemma. One option for protecting organizational efficiency is decoupling (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987; Weick, 1976), shielding internal activities that lie at the
organization’s technical core (Thompson, 1967) from activities involving external institutional
actors. Decoupling can involve practices of concealing and buffering, noted in Christine
Oliver’s (1991) typology of managerial responses as avoidance. This response falls at a midpoint of possible responses that run from low to high managerial agency. Those that reflect low
agency are acquiescence, with managers imitating and complying, and compromise, with
managers balancing and compromising between external and internal demands. More proactive
managerial responses involve escape from the field’s pressures and manipulation, which can be
achieved through co-opting or influencing external actors, such as creating new actors or
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legitimizing alternative beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Associated ways for managers to manipulate
proactively their institutional environments include lobbying, restricting sanctioned membership
in the organization’s field to an elite group, and creating standards for the field (Bresser &
Millonig, 2003).
Typologies of responses that are based on low vs. high agency implicitly assume that an
organization’s managers must trade off compliance with environmental pressures against selfdirected activities. However, the concept of integrative bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965)
suggests otherwise. One party in a negotiation with others can pursue its own interests strongly
while simultaneously attending to the interests of the other parties (Thomas, 1967). By doing so,
it can move beyond compromise to a joint maximization process that frames the bargaining as
collaborative problem solving capable of satisfying its own needs and those of other
stakeholders. Similarly, organizations can simultaneously achieve both resource-based
efficiency advantages and institutionally based legitimacy advantages by developing,
respectively, their resource and institutional capital (Bresser & Millonig, 2003).

Conflict and Monitoring vs. Cooperation and Collaboration
A second key dilemma pits conflict and monitoring against cooperation and
collaboration. Board member and executive leaders often falsely perceive a governance
environment split between conflict and monitoring on one hand and cooperation and
collaboration on the other. This bifurcated world undermines achievement of accountability and
engagement.
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From One Dimensional Theories of Nonprofit Governance to a Paradox Perspective
Morgan (1986) argues that many of the leading theories that strive to explain
organizational phenomena fail to encompass the full range of complex factors that make up the
lived-lives of real actors within actual contexts. Complex, multi-factor organizational dynamics
require multi-perspective approaches to manage inevitable ambiguities, dilemmas and tensions.
Moreover, as Cornforth (2004) points out, leaders and scholars have recognized for some time
that important problems often require shifting from linear to recursive thinking, from simple
either/or choices to yes/and explorations of tensions and differences. This line of thinking is
applied to organizational governance in the nonprofit sector, especially when leaders confront
three key operational tensions:


“The tension between board members acting as representatives for particular
stakeholder groups and ‘experts’ charged with driving the performance of the
organization forward;



The tension between the board roles of driving forward organizational
performance and ensuring conformance i.e. that the organization behaves in an
accountable and prudent manner; and,



The tension between the contrasting board roles of controlling and supporting
management.” (p 13)

These three tensions can be subsumed into a single category. Generally, leaders may
commonly perceive these tensions as two horns of a single dilemma with conflict and monitoring
on one tip and collaboration and cooperation on the other. Choosing one or the other may often
seem to be the only way off the hook. Leaders may not perceive transcending this dilemma as an
option.
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Cornforth (2004) goes on to highlight several competing, well-established, onedimensional theories or paradigms of governance including agency theory, stakeholder theory,
stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and managerial hegemony theory. Each of
these models tends to drive leaders to choose one horn of the dilemma over the other closing off
pathways to engaging with both dimensions simultaneously. Lewis (2000) discusses how taking
a multi perspective approach serves as a “sensitizing device” to the tensions between opposing
models in respect to how each resolves key operational tensions. Different theories of
governance produce different definitions of the role of the board and consequently lead to
different unitary choices for how to resolve one or other of the key dilemmas. For example,
agency theory naturally pushes leaders toward oppositional posturing and instrumental
monitoring of agent/executives in favor of optimizing owners’ interests. On the other hand, the
partnership model favors cross-role collaboration and cooperation to optimize effectiveness at
overall mission attainment often at the expense of efficient monitoring and auditing of
agent/executive management. Cornforth suggests that a multi-paradigm “paradox approach” that
is informed by the multiple aforementioned theoretical perspectives can lead to a new
synthetized conceptual framework of nonprofit governance – one that may possess the utility and
power to manage the key tensions holistically rather than choosing one dimension over the other.

Establishing a Paradox Perspective through Simultaneous Trust and Distrust
Lewicki (1998) and Luhmann (1979) reframe a unitary concept of trust and distrust in a
way that moves these concepts from a single continuum to two separate but linked ones. A
traditional view of trust, distrust and relationships based on unidimensional thinking, balance,
consistency and stasis is being replaced by a new one that embraces multidimensionality and
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paradox. Within the new view, it is not only possible but in some cases preferable, for parties to
both trust and distrust one another – both monitor and cooperate – given different experiences
within the various distinct facets of complex multidimensional relationships. The possibility of
possessing a dual capacity to embrace trust and distrust simultaneously suggests that leaders may
be able to transcend the dilemma of conflict and monitoring vs. cooperation and collaboration.
Lewicki (1998) defines trust as “confident positive expectations regarding another’s
conduct” and distrust as “confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct.” Both
concepts involve striving for certainty – in the case of trust, towards realizing one’s hopes; and in
the case of distrust, away from realizing one’s fears. The traditional view of relationships places
one’s efforts to maximize hopes through trusting and to minimize fears through distrusting on a
single continuum. It is as if hope/trust and fear/distrust are different faces of a single coin, and
that only one face may present at any given moment. Furthermore, the face of trust is always
“good” while the face of distrust is always “bad.” A final assumption of the traditional view is
that trust, distrust and relationships are unidimensional. To extend the coin metaphor, it is as if
one may possess only a single coin, and that single coin carries the totality of the trust or distrust
value for an entire relationship. Beyond the assumption that trust and distrust represent good and
bad parts of a single item within unidimensional relationships, the traditional view emphasizes
the emergence and maintenance of balance and consistency. Psychological imbalance and
inconsistency in respect to being ambivalent about trusting and distrusting is a negative
condition. Individual as well as collective “liking” and “disliking”, “trusting” and “distrusting”
naturally should resolve to a single, stable point that is distinctly good or bad, trusting or
distrusting. The traditional view of trust, distrust and relationships conjures the image of a
solitary coin spinning until it settles in a more or less fixed state to display one unambiguous face
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or another - thus offering the actor certainty, stability and direction either to maximize hopes
through trusting or to minimize fears through distrusting. According to the old view of
relationships, to trust or to distrust seems to come down to a coin toss.
Lewicki (1998) makes the case for a new view of trust and distrust that takes into account
the complexity, uncertainty, plasticity, and paradox of human relationships. He draws on
Luhmann’s (1979) articulation of trust and distrust as functional equivalents but separate
constructs. Both serve to reduce social complexity and uncertainty for rational actors – but each
does so using different means. In the case of trust, uncertainty is reduced because possible
undesirable conduct need not be considered while desirable conduct is considered certain. The
opposite is true for distrust. Both trust and distrust simplify the world by focusing and narrowing
expectations for either beneficial or negative conduct from the other.
Lewicki’s formulation emphasizes that trust and distrust exist as two separate dimensions
and:

For each dimension a quasi-stationary equilibrium of forces, composed of facets and
bands within bandwidth, sustains trust or distrust at specific levels. As specific facets in
the relationship change (through dialogue, interaction, joint decision making, common
experience, and so on), these changes tend to move the operational level of trust and
distrust upward or downward (p 455).

A two-dimensional framework is built around these assumptions with trust on the
vertical axis and distrust on the horizontal axis. Both dimensions are characterized as high or
low. The framework produces four prototypical relationship conditions: (1) low trust/low
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distrust, (2) high trust/low distrust, (3) low trust/high distrust, and (4) high trust/high distrust.
Each condition is characterized by distinct relationship opportunities and challenges. For
example, in high trust/low distrust (quadrant 3) relationships – the one that seems ideal from a
traditional perspective – actors have high confidence in each other and no reason to suspect each
other. Opportunities abound and partners readily pursue common aims. Many positive
experiences aggregate and solidify through reinforcing feedback loops. Interdependence expands
and widens. Appreciation, support and encouragement flourish. The trusting party is likely to
identify with the values of the trusted creating intimacy, social capitol, shared risk taking and
innovation. Parties are vigilant at interceding to restore trust when it is threatened. However,
significant challenges emerge directly from these opportunities. All too often evidence of bad
behavior and ill intent is judged suspect or rationalized away. Real threats are minimized or
ignored in the name of preserving trust, which cuts off natural, useful, and necessary emergence
of distrust. The capacity to address inevitable threats is diminished. Contrary to what might be
expected and welcomed by one who holds a traditional view of trust and distrust, the potential
for organizational dysfunction is significant when conditions are characterized by high trust/low
distrust. Organizational complexity, role conflict, ambiguity, and the existence of greed and fear
in human nature dictate that low distrust is a risky condition especially when paired with high
trust. High trust/low distrust conditions inure actors to real threats especially from close partners.
Lewicki suggests that the argument concerning the “strength of week ties” (Granovetter, 1973) is
instructive here. Granovetter notes that as the strength of relational ties ease, the possibility to
establish and grow operational trust and distrust rises.
Unlike the condition of high trust/low distrust, the condition of high trust/high distrust –
the condition that seems ideal from a nontraditional multi-paradigm paradox perspective –
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produces opportunities for success in managing, coordinating, and governing complex
organizations. Relationship partners may trust each other in certain respects and not trust each
other in other respects. They may even distrust each other in yet other respects. A multifaceted
approach to trust and distrust represents a chosen strategy for minimizing expected undesired
conduct and leveraging expected desired conduct. For example, in the case of nonprofit
governance, trust (e.g., hope, faith, confidence, assurance, initiative) may define the facets of a
relationship that effectively address issues of mission-based effectiveness and innovation, while
distrust (fear, skepticism, cynicism, watchfulness, vigilance) may define the facets of the same
relationship that effectively address issues of resource efficiency, budgeting, auditing, etc..
Table 1 represents Lewicki, McAllister and Bies’s integration of trust and distrust, and
this author’s interpretation of traditional vs. paradox perspectives. Each quadrant is a assigned a
name that is intended to describe its nature. Quadrant 1, Passivity, represent Low Trust/Low
Distrust. Quadrant 2, Pollyanna, represents high trust/low distrust. Quadrant 3, Terror,
represents low trust/high distrust. Finally, Quadrant 4, Trust but Verify, represents high trust/
high distrust. Most telling is a comparison and contrast of the quadrants in respect to traditional
and paradox perspectives. In this paper’s interpretation the Pollyanna and Trust but Verify
quadrants are in clear contradiction in respect to what is desirable and undesirable in
trust/distrust relationships, while the Passivity and Terror quadrants are aligned.
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Designing, establishing and sustaining the condition of high trust/high distrust (the Trust
but Verify quadrant in Table 1) may represent one path for nonprofit leaders to transcend the
false dilemma of conflict and monitoring vs. cooperation and collaboration.
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Conclusion
The concepts described in this paper throw light on how leaders can go beyond balancing
false dilemmas to transcend them. In the case of the legitimacy vs. efficiency dilemma, leaders
may engage in actions that respond simultaneously to external expectations and demands for
organizational effectiveness through relational practices such as integrated negotiation. In the
case of the conflict/monitoring vs cooperation/collaboration dilemma, leaders may engage in
actions that manage relationships that are trusting in some facets and distrusting in others.
This paper represents an emerging perspective on how nonprofit boards can achieve
authentic engagement to achieve broadened accountability, meaningful commitment and bold
decision making. This paper offers an initial description of potential pathways to establishing a
multi-perspective “paradox approach” by overcoming fundamental obstacles through radically
reframing each. Fundamental to each of the reframing processes is the need for board member
and executive leaders to establish and maintain unique and ever evolving relational practices
between and among each other. In the case of the false dilemmas of legitimacy vs. efficiency as
well as conflict and monitoring vs. cooperation and collaboration, it is possible to transcend an
either/or proposition by reframing the classic view of governance from one based on roles,
responsibilities and structures to one based on social competence (Bresser & Millonig, 2003;
Deephouse, 1996; Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995).
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